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ARGUMENT 
Appellant, S. Chad Godfrey ("Mr. Godfrey") submits the following arguments in 
reply to the brief of the Plaintiff/Appellee in this matter. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY RELYING ON A SUPPOSED 
ORDER COMPELLING DISCOVERY THAT DID NOT ACTUALLY EXIST. 
Throughout its brief, plaintiff consistently refers to an order of the Trial Court compelling 
Mr. Godfrey to produce discovery. A thorough search of the record reveals no such order. The 
Trial Court's Order of April 21, 1997, regarding discovery simply states that once sanctions are 
paid, "the parties shall thereafter schedule the deposition of S. Chad Godfrey at a time and place 
agreeable to counsel." (R. at 217-18.) There is no language in that Order compelling production 
of documents. 
At the hearing on plaintiffs Second Motion for Sanctions,1 the Trial Court erroneously 
assumed, without reviewing the record, that such an order to compel had been entered previously. 
The court stated: "I set a deadline for discovery responses in the first order, but I haven't 
reviewed that particular order, but that's my practice . . . ." (R. at 548, at p. 33.) The 
Trial Court did not verify whether it had, in fact, placed such requirements in its Order 
dated April 21, 1997. Rather, the Trial Court, from the bench, proceeded on its incorrect 
assumption and authorized default judgment against Mr. Godfrey. 
This assumption was incorrect. The Trial Court did not, in fact, enter an order 
compelling discovery or setting a deadline for discovery responses, nor did it take the 
lA copy of the transcript of the relevant portions of that hearing are attached in 
addendum C to Mr. Godfrey's principal brief. 
1 
opportunity to review the record to verify the accuracy of its stated assumption. 
Therefore, the Trial Court abused its discretion by defaulting Mr. Godfrey based on that 
flawed assumption. 
Plaintiff argues that its second Motion for Sanctions was based on subsection (d) 
of Rule 37, Utah R. Civ. P., and thus, no compelling order was required. That 
subsection, however, is not completely applicable here; it only authorizes sanctions if a 
party fails to appear for a scheduled deposition, after proper service of notice, or fails to 
respond in writing to a request for inspection pursuant to Rule 34. It is not disputed that 
Mr. Godfrey was prepared to be sworn and deposed on the day and at the location of his 
scheduled deposition. He was downstairs, prepared to come to the designated room for 
the deposition. Plaintiffs counsel, however, chose not to depose him. (R. at 315, 324.) 
Further, it is not disputed that Mr. Godfrey brought certain documents with him at that 
time, which documents were delivered to Plaintiffs counsel that morning. Those 
documents were produced as a result of a diligent search by both defendants for 
documents responsive to Plaintiffs requests, and were documents pertaining to Mr. 
Godfrey responsive to the document requests. Thus, because Mr. Godfrey complied with 
the requests and the deposition notice to the best of his ability, sanctions under any part 
of Rule 37 were not appropriate. 
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II. IT WAS AN ABUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION TO SANCTION 
MR. GODFREY WITH THE ULTIMATE SANCTION - DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT - ARISING OUT OF THE INABILITY. AFTER DILIGENT 
SEARCHING. TO LOCATE DOCUMENTS IT WAS NOT HIS DUTY TO 
MAINTAIN. 
Plaintiffs discovery request sought the Bank Records ~ documents that pertain 
solely to the business of co-defendant, The Beehive House, and which should normally 
be in the control and possession of that entity.2 As set forth at length in Mr. Godfrey's 
principal brief, Mr. Godfrey and The Beehive House undertook significant efforts to 
locate those documents as soon as the request was received—not just the day prior to the 
scheduled deposition, as Plaintiff suggests. The search was not fruitful, despite their 
diligent efforts. Plaintiff, however, mischaracterizes Mr. Godfrey's argument. Mr. 
Godfrey does not take the position that sanctions were inappropriate solely because the 
Bank Records were in the possession of The Beehive House and not in his possession. 
Nor does Mr. Godfrey suggest anywhere that Plaintiff is not entitled to the Bank Records 
it has requested. Mr. Godfrey simply argues that default judgment was too harsh a 
sanction when (1) both defendants, after reasonable efforts, could not locate the Bank 
Records in time for the scheduled deposition and (2) it was not Mr. Godfrey's duty to 
maintain the Bank Records or produce them. 
Mr. Godfrey simply had no duty to maintain or control those documents. That fact 
is emphasized by the Trial Court's conundrum regarding this issue created at the hearing 
2This Reply Brief employs the same abbreviations and short-hand references, such as 
"Bank Documents" as used and identified in Mr. Godfrey's principal brief. 
3 
on plaintiffs second Motion for Sanctions. The Trial Court first castigated Mr. Godfrey 
for not producing the Bank Records. Moments later, the court criticized The Beehive 
House for allowing Mr. Godfrey, as a non-employee, to look for the Bank Records. (R. 
at 548, p.38). It was simply not fair to Mr. Godfrey for the Trial Court to impose the 
most drastic sanction available because the other defendant was unable to locate its 
documents, even after a thorough search for them. See Shepherd v. American 
Broadcasting Companies. Inc.. 62 F.3d 1469, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
III. MR. GODFREY HAS SATISFIED THE MARSHALLING REQUIREMENT. 
Plaintiff argues that Mr. Godfrey's brief is deficient because it does not "marshall" 
the evidence. Generally, an appellant only needs to marshall the evidence if he is 
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's or the jury's 
findings of fact. The appellant must then show that "despite this evidence, the trial 
couifs findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the 
evidence."1 Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah App. 
1989) (quoting In re BartelL 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)). Where the findings are not 
challenged and the review turns on a question of law, however, marshalling is not 
required. See Associates v. First Security Financial. 889 P.2d 467 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
In the present case, the marshalling requirement is satisfied for two reasons. First, 
Mr. Godfrey is not challenging any findings because the Trial Court did not make any 
specific findings, per se. against him. The court simply reviewed the affidavits, 
4 
memoranda, and arguments of counsel and determined that Mr. Godfrey should be 
defaulted because the Bank Records had not been produced. Mr. Godfrey does not 
dispute that the Bank Records had not been produced at that point, but he challenges the 
Trial Court's imposition of sanctions as an abuse of discretion, as a matter of law. See 
Askew v. Hardman. 918 P.2d 469 (Utah 1996) (review of abuse of discretion in entering 
discovery sanctions is, primarily, a question of law). 
Second, beyond the affidavits of DeeAnn Schaugaard and Mr. Godfrey, as well as 
a few lines from the deposition of B. Ralph Godfrey, there is no further evidence to 
marshall. The facts in those affidavits have all been set forth and discussed in Mr. 
Godfrey's principal brief. No evidence was presented at the hearing on the Plaintiffs 
Motion for Sanctions, and a transcript of that hearing is attached as Addendum C to Mr. 
Godfrey's principal brief. (See Transcript R. at 548, pp. 34-35.) Thus, to the extent any 
marshalling would be necessary, it has been done by setting forth those facts in the brief. 
As such, Plaintiffs argument is unpersuasive. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant S. Chad Godfrey respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse and vacate the trial court's November 18, 1997 Default Order (Order on 
Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Make Discovery), as to him, and vacate the 
entry of default and default judgment against him. 
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DATED faSj day of December, 1998. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Kim K. Wilson 
David L. Pinkston 
Attorneys for S. Chad Godfrey 
VlAA. 
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